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Exploitation aversion : when financial incentives fail to motivate agents

Carpenter, Jeffrey P.; Dolifka, David - 2013

rewards to performance increases effort, but that they can also backfire, reducing effort. Intrinsic motivation, the internal …. If the incentives crowd-out intrinsic motivation, and the effect is large enough, the net motivational effect on effort …, is one facet of intrinsic motivation, triggered by the combination of high-powered incentives and egoistic principal …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009771729

Exploitation Aversion : When Financial Incentives Fail to Motivate Agents

Carpenter, Jeffrey P. - 2013

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013078830

Exploitation aversion : when financial incentives fail to motivate agents

Carpenter, Jeffrey P.; Dolifka, David - In: Journal of economic psychology : research in economic … 61 (2017), pp. 213-224

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011757213

Incentives for Experimenting Agents

Horner, Johannes - 2013

We examine a repeated interaction between an agent, who undertakes experiments, and a principal who provides the requisite funding for these experiments. The repeated interaction gives rise to a dynamic agency cost — the more lucrative is the agent's stream of future rents following a failure,...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013084929

Incentives for Experimenting Agents

Horner, Johannes - 2013

We examine a repeated interaction between an agent, who undertakes experiments, and a principal who provides the requisite funding for these experiments. The repeated interaction gives rise to a dynamic agency cost – the more lucrative is the agent's stream of future rents following a failure,...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013080479

Incentives for Experimenting Agents

Horner, Johannes; Samuelson, Larry - 2009

We examine a repeated interaction between an agent, who undertakes experiments, and a principal who provides the requisite funding for these experiments. The agent's actions are hidden, and the principal, who makes the offers, cannot commit to future actions. We identify the unique Markovian...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014204396

Incentives for Experimenting Agents

Horner, Johannes - 2012

We examine a repeated interaction between an agent, who undertakes experiments, and a principal who provides the requisite funding for these experiments. The agent's actions are hidden, and the principal cannot commit to future actions. The repeated interaction gives rise to a dynamic agency...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013111103

Motivating agents : how much does the mission matter?

Carpenter, Jeffrey P.; Gong, Erick - 2013

Economic theory predicts that agents will work harder if they believe in the "mission" of the organization. Well-identified estimates of exactly how much harder they will work have been elusive, however, because agents select into jobs. We conduct a real effort experiment with participants who...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010125806