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Exploitation aversion : when financial incentives fail to motivate agents
Carpenter, Jeffrey P.; Dolifka, David - 2013
rewards to performance increases effort, but that they can also backfire, reducing effort. Intrinsic motivation, the internal …. If the incentives crowd-out intrinsic motivation, and the effect is large enough, the net motivational effect on effort …, is one facet of intrinsic motivation, triggered by the combination of high-powered incentives and egoistic principal …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009771729
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Exploitation Aversion : When Financial Incentives Fail to Motivate Agents
Carpenter, Jeffrey P. - 2013
rewards to performance increases effort, but that they can also backfire, reducing effort. Intrinsic motivation, the internal …. If the incentives crowd-out intrinsic motivation, and the effect is large enough, the net motivational effect on effort …, is one facet of intrinsic motivation, triggered by the combination of high-powered incentives and egoistic principal …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013078830
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Exploitation aversion : when financial incentives fail to motivate agents
Carpenter, Jeffrey P.; Dolifka, David - In: Journal of economic psychology : research in economic … 61 (2017), pp. 213-224
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011757213
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Employee screening : theory and evidence
Huang, Fali; Cappelli, Peter - 2006
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003296792
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Employee Screening : Theory and Evidence
Huang, Fali; Cappelli, Peter - 2021
Arguably the fundamental problem faced by employers is how to elicit effort from employees. Most models suggest that employers meet this challenge by monitoring employees carefully to prevent shirking. But there is another option that relies on heterogeneity across employees, and that is to...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013221983
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Employee Screening : Theory and Evidence
Huang, Fali - 2011
Arguably the fundamental problem faced by employers is how to elicit effort from employees. Most models suggest that employers meet this challenge by monitoring employees carefully to prevent shirking. But there is another option that relies on heterogeneity across employees, and that is to...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012714617
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Employee Screening : Theory and Evidence
Huang, Fali - 2006
Arguably the fundamental problem faced by employers is how to elicit effort from employees. Most models suggest that employers meet this challenge by monitoring employees carefully to prevent shirking. But there is another option that relies on heterogeneity across employees, and that is to...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012466598
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Motivating agents : how much does the mission matter?
Carpenter, Jeffrey P.; Gong, Erick - 2013
Economic theory predicts that agents will work harder if they believe in the "mission" of the organization. Well-identified estimates of exactly how much harder they will work have been elusive, however, because agents select into jobs. We conduct a real effort experiment with participants who...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010125806