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Exploitation aversion : when financial incentives fail to motivate agents
Carpenter, Jeffrey P.; Dolifka, David - 2013
rewards to performance increases effort, but that they can also backfire, reducing effort. Intrinsic motivation, the internal …. If the incentives crowd-out intrinsic motivation, and the effect is large enough, the net motivational effect on effort …, is one facet of intrinsic motivation, triggered by the combination of high-powered incentives and egoistic principal …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009771729
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Exploitation Aversion : When Financial Incentives Fail to Motivate Agents
Carpenter, Jeffrey P. - 2013
rewards to performance increases effort, but that they can also backfire, reducing effort. Intrinsic motivation, the internal …. If the incentives crowd-out intrinsic motivation, and the effect is large enough, the net motivational effect on effort …, is one facet of intrinsic motivation, triggered by the combination of high-powered incentives and egoistic principal …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013078830
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Exploitation aversion : when financial incentives fail to motivate agents
Carpenter, Jeffrey P.; Dolifka, David - In: Journal of economic psychology : research in economic … 61 (2017), pp. 213-224
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011757213
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More effort with less pay : on information avoidance, belief design and performance
Huck, Steffen; Szech, Nora; Wenner, Lukas M. - 2015 - June 2015, revised September 2015
In a tedious real effort task, subjects know that their piece rate is either low or ten times higher. When subjects are informed about their piece rate realization, they adapt their performance. One third of subjects nevertheless forego this instrumental information when given the choice - and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011340265
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More effort with less pay: on information avoidance, belief design and performance
Huck, Steffen; Szech, Nora; Wenner, Lukas M. - 2015
In a tedious real effort task, subjects know that their piece rate is either low or ten times higher. When subjects are informed about their piece rate realization, they adapt their performance. One third of subjects nevertheless forego this instrumental information when given the choice - and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011342145
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More effort with less pay : on information avoidance, belief design and performance
Huck, Steffen; Szech, Nora; Wenner, Lukas M. - 2015
In a tedious real effort task, subjects know that their piece rate is either low or ten times higher. When subjects are informed about their piece rate realization, they adapt their performance. One third of subjects nevertheless forego this instrumental information when given the choice - and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011346303
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Motivating agents : how much does the mission matter?
Carpenter, Jeffrey P.; Gong, Erick - 2013
Economic theory predicts that agents will work harder if they believe in the "mission" of the organization. Well-identified estimates of exactly how much harder they will work have been elusive, however, because agents select into jobs. We conduct a real effort experiment with participants who...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010125806
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More effort with less pay : on information avoidance, optimistic beliefs, and performance
Huck, Steffen; Szech, Nora; Wenner, Lukas M. - 2017
Recent behavioral models argue in favor of avoidance of instrumental information. We explore the role of information avoidance in a real-effort setting. Our experiment offers three main results. First, we confirm that preferences for avoidance of instrumental information exist, studying...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011751477