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Exploitation aversion : when financial incentives fail to motivate agents
Carpenter, Jeffrey P.; Dolifka, David - 2013
rewards to performance increases effort, but that they can also backfire, reducing effort. Intrinsic motivation, the internal …. If the incentives crowd-out intrinsic motivation, and the effect is large enough, the net motivational effect on effort …, is one facet of intrinsic motivation, triggered by the combination of high-powered incentives and egoistic principal …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009771729
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Exploitation Aversion : When Financial Incentives Fail to Motivate Agents
Carpenter, Jeffrey P. - 2013
rewards to performance increases effort, but that they can also backfire, reducing effort. Intrinsic motivation, the internal …. If the incentives crowd-out intrinsic motivation, and the effect is large enough, the net motivational effect on effort …, is one facet of intrinsic motivation, triggered by the combination of high-powered incentives and egoistic principal …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013078830
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Exploitation aversion : when financial incentives fail to motivate agents
Carpenter, Jeffrey P.; Dolifka, David - In: Journal of economic psychology : research in economic … 61 (2017), pp. 213-224
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011757213
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Incentives for experimenting agents
Hörner, Johannes; Samuelson, Larry - 2009
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003873500
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Incentives for experimenting agents
Hörner, Johannes; Samuelson, Larry - In: The Rand journal of economics 44 (2013) 4, pp. 632-663
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010344507
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Incentives for Experimenting Agents
Horner, Johannes - 2013
We examine a repeated interaction between an agent, who undertakes experiments, and a principal who provides the requisite funding for these experiments. The repeated interaction gives rise to a dynamic agency cost — the more lucrative is the agent's stream of future rents following a failure,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013084929
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Incentives for Experimenting Agents
Horner, Johannes - 2013
We examine a repeated interaction between an agent, who undertakes experiments, and a principal who provides the requisite funding for these experiments. The repeated interaction gives rise to a dynamic agency cost – the more lucrative is the agent's stream of future rents following a failure,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013080479
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Incentives for Experimenting Agents
Horner, Johannes; Samuelson, Larry - 2009
We examine a repeated interaction between an agent, who undertakes experiments, and a principal who provides the requisite funding for these experiments. The agent's actions are hidden, and the principal, who makes the offers, cannot commit to future actions. We identify the unique Markovian...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014204396
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Incentives for Experimenting Agents
Horner, Johannes - 2012
We examine a repeated interaction between an agent, who undertakes experiments, and a principal who provides the requisite funding for these experiments. The agent's actions are hidden, and the principal cannot commit to future actions. The repeated interaction gives rise to a dynamic agency...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013111103
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Motivating agents : how much does the mission matter?
Carpenter, Jeffrey P.; Gong, Erick - 2013
Economic theory predicts that agents will work harder if they believe in the "mission" of the organization. Well-identified estimates of exactly how much harder they will work have been elusive, however, because agents select into jobs. We conduct a real effort experiment with participants who...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010125806