Similar Search Results

Exploitation aversion : when financial incentives fail to motivate agents

Carpenter, Jeffrey P.; Dolifka, David - 2013

rewards to performance increases effort, but that they can also backfire, reducing effort. Intrinsic motivation, the internal …. If the incentives crowd-out intrinsic motivation, and the effect is large enough, the net motivational effect on effort …, is one facet of intrinsic motivation, triggered by the combination of high-powered incentives and egoistic principal …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009771729

Exploitation Aversion : When Financial Incentives Fail to Motivate Agents

Carpenter, Jeffrey P. - 2013

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013078830

Ceding control : an experimental analysis of participatory management

Mellizo, Philip; Carpenter, Jeffrey P.; Matthews, Peter Hans - 2017

We use an experiment to evaluate the effects of participatory management on firm performance. Participants are randomly assigned roles as managers or workers in firms that generate output via real effort. To identify the causal effect of participation on effort, workers are exogenously assigned...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011613160

Exploitation aversion : when financial incentives fail to motivate agents

Carpenter, Jeffrey P.; Dolifka, David - In: Journal of economic psychology : research in economic … 61 (2017), pp. 213-224

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011757213

Tournaments and office politics : evidence from a real effort experiment

Carpenter, Jeffrey P. (contributor); … - 2007

In many environments, tournaments can elicit more effort from workers, except perhaps when workers can sabotage each other. Because it is hard to separate effort, ability and output in many real workplace settings, the empirical evidence on the incentive effect of tournaments is thin. There is...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003635203

Mutual monitoring in teams : theory and experimental evidence on the importance of reciprocity

Carpenter, Jeffrey P. (contributor); … - 2006

Monitoring by peers is often an effective means of attenuating incentive problems. Most explanations of the efficacy of mutual monitoring rely either on small group size or on a version of the Folk theorem with repeated interactions which requires reasonably accurate public information...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003314674

Mutual monitoring in teams : theory and experimental evidence on the importance of reciprocity

Carpenter, Jeffrey P.; Bowles, Samuel; Gintis, Herbert - 2006

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003836257

Tournaments and office politics : evidence from a real effort experiment

Carpenter, Jeffrey P.; Matthews, Peter Hans; Schirm, John - 2007

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003836402

Tournaments and office politics : evidence from a real effort experiment

Carpenter, Jeffrey P.; Matthews, Peter Hans; Schirm, John - In: The American economic review 100 (2010) 1, pp. 504-517

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008732319

Motivating agents : how much does the mission matter?

Carpenter, Jeffrey P.; Gong, Erick - 2013

Economic theory predicts that agents will work harder if they believe in the "mission" of the organization. Well-identified estimates of exactly how much harder they will work have been elusive, however, because agents select into jobs. We conduct a real effort experiment with participants who...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010125806