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Exploitation aversion : when financial incentives fail to motivate agents
Carpenter, Jeffrey P.; Dolifka, David - 2013
rewards to performance increases effort, but that they can also backfire, reducing effort. Intrinsic motivation, the internal …. If the incentives crowd-out intrinsic motivation, and the effect is large enough, the net motivational effect on effort …, is one facet of intrinsic motivation, triggered by the combination of high-powered incentives and egoistic principal …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009771729
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Exploitation Aversion : When Financial Incentives Fail to Motivate Agents
Carpenter, Jeffrey P. - 2013
rewards to performance increases effort, but that they can also backfire, reducing effort. Intrinsic motivation, the internal …. If the incentives crowd-out intrinsic motivation, and the effect is large enough, the net motivational effect on effort …, is one facet of intrinsic motivation, triggered by the combination of high-powered incentives and egoistic principal …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013078830
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Exploitation aversion : when financial incentives fail to motivate agents
Carpenter, Jeffrey P.; Dolifka, David - In: Journal of economic psychology : research in economic … 61 (2017), pp. 213-224
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011757213
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Tournaments and office politics : evidence from a real effort experiment
Carpenter, Jeffrey P. (contributor);  … - 2007
In many environments, tournaments can elicit more effort from workers, except perhaps when workers can sabotage each other. Because it is hard to separate effort, ability and output in many real workplace settings, the empirical evidence on the incentive effect of tournaments is thin. There is...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003635203
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Tournaments and office politics : evidence from a real effort experiment
Carpenter, Jeffrey P.; Matthews, Peter Hans; Schirm, John - 2007
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003836402
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Tournaments and office politics : evidence from a real effort experiment
Carpenter, Jeffrey P.; Matthews, Peter Hans; Schirm, John - In: The American economic review 100 (2010) 1, pp. 504-517
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008732319
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Motivating agents : how much does the mission matter?
Carpenter, Jeffrey P.; Gong, Erick - 2013
Economic theory predicts that agents will work harder if they believe in the "mission" of the organization. Well-identified estimates of exactly how much harder they will work have been elusive, however, because agents select into jobs. We conduct a real effort experiment with participants who...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010125806
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Tournaments and Office Politics : Evidence from a Real Effort Experiment
Carpenter, Jeffrey P. - 2007
In many environments, tournaments can elicit more effort from workers, except perhaps when workers can sabotage each other. Because it is hard to separate effort, ability and output in many real workplace settings, the empirical evidence on the incentive effect of tournaments is thin. There is...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012776121
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Gender differences in interpersonal and intrapersonal competitive behavior
Carpenter, Jeffrey P.; Frank, Rachel; Huet-Vaughn, Emiliano - 2017
Gender differences in competitive behavior have been well documented by economists and other social scientists; however, the bulk of the research addresses competition with others and excludes other economically relevant competition that may contribute to the gender pay gap. In this paper, we...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011631427