Seminal models of herd behaviour and informational cascades point out existence of negative information externalities, and propose to ?destroy? information in order to achieve social improvements. Although in the last years many features of herd behaviour and informational cascades have been...

Seminal models of herd behaviour and informational cascades point out existence of negative information externalities, and propose to ?destroy? information in order to achieve social improvements. Although in the last years many features of herd behaviour and informational cascades have been...

Seminal models of herd behaviour and informational cascades point out existence of negative information externalities, and propose to ?destroy? information in order to achieve social improvements. Although in the last years many features of herd behaviour and informational cascades have been...

Seminal models of herd behaviour and informational cascades point out existence of negative information externalities, and propose to ?destroy? information in order to achieve social improvements. Although in the last years many features of herd behaviour and informational cascades have been...

This paper studies a game of strategic experimentation with two-armed bandits whose risky arm might yield a payoff only after some exponentially distributed random time. Because of free-riding, there is an inefficiently low level of experimentation in any equilibrium where the players use...

A large literature suggests that the expected equity risk premium is countercyclical. Using a variety of different measures for this risk premium, we document that it also exhibits growth asymmetry, i.e. the risk premium rises sharply in recessions and declines much more gradually during the...

This paper studies a game of strategic experimentation with two-armed bandits whose risky arm might yield a payoff only after some exponentially distributed random time. Because of free-riding, there is an inefficiently low level of experimentation in any equilibrium where the players use...

This paper studies a game of strategic experimentation with two-armed bandits whose risky arm might yield a payoff only after some exponentially distributed random time. Because of free-riding, there is an inefficiently low level of experimentation in any equilibrium where the players use...