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signalling game and test it experimentally. If we have participants play the naked game, at least a minority plays the game …, almost all prosecutors take the signal at face value and knowingly run the risk of loosing in court if the signal was false …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010286722
in effort, but that the reverse does not hold true. Using a lab experiment, we show that redistribution choices even …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010323858
The market for copyrights is characterised by a highly skewed distribution of profits: very few movies, books and songs generate huge profits, whereas the great bulk barely manages to recover production cost. At the moment when the owner of intellectual property grants a licence ('ex ante'),...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010270447
prevent participants from using their world knowledge about antitrust, we experimentally test them on a neutral matrix game …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010281843
, we adopt an experimental approach to test these claims. We show that the willingness to overcome a dilemma transcends …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010286718
-handed mechanism to sustain cooperation and test its performance in a rich laboratory environment. The mechanism moderates cooperation …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010281841
controlled conditions, we have conducted a public goods experiment with central punishment. The authority is neutral - she does …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010323857
Experimental participants are more likely to follow an arbitrary rule the more of their peers do so as well. The difference between unconditional and conditional rule following is most pronounced for individuals who follow few rules unconditionally.
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011688384
entire estate goes to the eldest son. Combining a survey with a lab in the field experiment, we show that this is still the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012659964
We study the effect of voting when insiders´ public goods provision may affect passive outsiders. Without voting insiders´ contributions do not differ, regardless of whether outsiders are positively or negatively affected or even unaffected. Voting on the recommended contribution level...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010478914