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Optimal unemployment insurance design : time limits, monitoring, or workfare?
Fredriksson, Peter; Holmlund, Bertil - 2003
workfare. To that end we develop a quantitative model of equilibrium unemployment. The model features worker heterogeneity … monitoring and sanctions than in the other two systems. Workfare appears to be inferior to the other two systems. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011509411
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Optimal Unemployment Insurance Design:Time Limits, Monitoring, or Workfare?
Fredriksson, Peter; Holmlund, Bertil - 2003
workfare. To that end we develop a quantitative model of equilibrium unemployment. The model features worker heterogeneity … monitoring and sanctions than in the other two systems. Workfare appears to be inferior to the other two systems. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010321532
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Improving Incentives in Unemployment Insurance: A Review of Recent Research
Fredriksson, Peter; Holmlund, Bertil - 2003
sequencing of benefits), monitoring in conjunction with sanctions, and workfare. Our reading of the theoretical literature is …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010321601
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Optimal unemployment insurance design: Time limits, monitoring, or workfare
Fredriksson, Peter; Holmlund, Bertil - 2005
workfare. To that end we develop a quantitative model of equilibrium unemployment. The model features worker heterogeneity in …. Workfare appears to be inferior to the other two systems. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010317971
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Improving incentives in unemployment insurance: A review of recent research
Fredriksson, Peter; Holmlund, Bertil - 2003
sequencing of benefits), monitoring in conjunction with sanctions, and workfare. Our reading of the theoretical literature is …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010321098
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Improving incentives in unemployment insurance : a review of recent research
Fredriksson, Peter; Holmlund, Bertil - 2003
sequencing of benefits), monitoring in conjunction with sanctions, and workfare. Our reading of the theoretical literature is …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011507749
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Optimal Umemployment Insurance Design : Time Limits, Monitoring, or Workfare?
Fredriksson, Peter; Holmlund, Bertil - 2021
workfare. To that end we develop a quantitative model of equilibrium unemployment. The model features worker heterogeneity … monitoring and sanctions than in the other two systems. Workfare appears to be inferior to the other two systems …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013319793
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Improving incentives in unemployment insurance: A review of recent research
Fredriksson, Peter; Holmlund, Bertil - Institutet för Arbetsmarknads- och Utbildningspolitisk … - 2003
sequencing of benefits), monitoring in conjunction with sanctions, and workfare. Our reading of the theoretical literature is …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005651906
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Improving incentives in unemployment insurance : a review of recent research
Fredriksson, Peter; Holmlund, Bertil - 2003
sequencing of benefits), monitoring in conjunction with sanctions, and workfare. Our reading of the theoretical literature is …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011575185
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Employment, Mobility, and Active Labor Market Programs
Fredriksson, Peter; Johansson, Per - 2003
Using a unique micro panel data set we investigate whether active labor market programs improve employment prospects and increase mobility in the longer run. We consider two prototype programs: job creation programs and training programs. We find that both programs reduce the chances of finding...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010321597