The German law on employees' inventions requires employees to report to their employer any invention made in relation with the work contract. An employer claiming the right to the invention is obliged to pay a compensation to the employee. Up to now, this compensation is a matter of...

We analyze the legal reform concerning employees? inventions in Germany. Using a simple principal-agent model, we derive a unique efficient payment scheme: a bonus which is contingent on the project value. We demonstrate that the old German law creates inefficient incentives. However, the new...

The German law on employees' inventions requires employees to report to their employer any invention made in relation with the work contract. An employer claiming the right to the invention is obliged to pay a compensation to the employee. Up to now, this compensation is a matter of...

We analyze the legal reform concerning employees' inventions in Germany. Using a simple principal-agent model, we derive a unique efficient payment scheme: a bonus which is contingent on the project value. We demonstrate that the old German law creates inefficient incentives. However, the new...

In Germany, employers can claim the right to any invention made by their employees, but have to pay a compensation if they do so. Recently this compensation was made subject to a legal reform proposal (and a new law concerning university employees). We set up a simple Principal-Agent model to...

In Germany, employers can claim the right to any invention made by their employees, but have to pay a compensation if they do so. Recently this compensation was made subject to a legal reform proposal (and a new law concerning university employees). We set up a simple Principal-Agent model to...