We modify the classic single-period inventory management problem by assuming that the newsvendor is expectation-based loss averse according to Köszegi and Rabin (2006, 2007). Expectation-based loss aversion leads to an endogenous psychological cost of leftovers as well as stockouts. If there...

We modify the classic single-period inventory management problem by assuming that the newsvendor is expectation-based loss averse according to Koszegi and Rabin (2006, 2007). Expectation-based loss aversion leads to an endogenous psychological cost of leftovers as well as stockouts. If there are...

Consider a simple two-state risk with equal probabilities for the two states. In particular, assume that the random wealth variable Xi dominates Yi via ith-order stochastic dominance for i = M,N. We show that the 50-50 lottery [XN + YM, YN + XM] dominates the lottery [XN + XM, YN + YM] via (N +...

We modify the principal-agent model with moral hazard by assuming that the agent is expectation-based loss averse according to Köszegi and Rabin (2006, 2007). The optimal contract is a binary payment scheme even for a rich performance measure, where standard preferences predict a fully...