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short and medium term, up to five years after displacement. Our analysis is based on rich administrative data from Germany …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011596874
recipients to stay unemployed. Empirical evidence about the effects of UI sanctions in Germany is sparse. Using administrative … data we investigate the effects of sanctions on the reemployment probability in West Germany for individuals who entered UI …. The results indicate positive effects on the employment probability in regular employment for both women and men …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003805997
Die Bundesagentur für Arbeit hat im Mai 2007 ein Pilotprojekt gestartet, bei dem in 14 Dienststellen der Betreuungssschlüssel (Zahl der Arbeitslosen pro Vermittler) deutlich reduziert wurde. Da die teilnehmenden Dienststellen nicht zufällig ausgewählt wurden, ist bei der Evaluation eine...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003874351
Unemployment insurance agencies may combat moral hazard by punishing refusals to apply to assigned vacancies. However, the possibility to report sick creates an additional moral hazard, since during sickness spells, minimum requirements on search behavior do not apply. This reduces the ex ante...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011418245
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011438022
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010423453
Unemployment insurance agencies may combat moral hazard by punishing refusals to apply to assigned vacancies. However, the possibility to report sick creates an additional moral hazard, since during sickness spells, minimum requirements on search behavior do not apply. This reduces the ex ante...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011449662
Unemployment insurance agencies may combat moral hazard by punishing refusals to apply to assigned vacancies. However, the possibility to report sick creates an additional moral hazard, since during sickness spells, minimum requirements on search behavior do not apply. This reduces the ex-ante...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013000204
Unemployment insurance agencies may combat moral hazard by punishing refusals to apply to assigned vacancies. However, the possibility to report sick creates an additional moral hazard, since during sickness spells, minimum requirements on search behavior do not apply. This reduces the ex ante...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013001341
In the German unemployment insurance system, Integration Agreements (IA) are mandatory contracts between the employment … this. The results show that IAs early in the spell have on average a small positive effect on entering employment within a … adverse prospects. Among them, being assigned to an early IA increases the probability of re-employment within a year from 45 …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013251531