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Optimal unemployment insurance design : time limits, monitoring, or workfare?
Fredriksson, Peter; Holmlund, Bertil - 2003
workfare. To that end we develop a quantitative model of equilibrium unemployment. The model features worker heterogeneity … monitoring and sanctions than in the other two systems. Workfare appears to be inferior to the other two systems. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011509411
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Optimal Unemployment Insurance Design:Time Limits, Monitoring, or Workfare?
Fredriksson, Peter; Holmlund, Bertil - 2003
workfare. To that end we develop a quantitative model of equilibrium unemployment. The model features worker heterogeneity … monitoring and sanctions than in the other two systems. Workfare appears to be inferior to the other two systems. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010321532
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Improving Incentives in Unemployment Insurance: A Review of Recent Research
Fredriksson, Peter; Holmlund, Bertil - 2003
sequencing of benefits), monitoring in conjunction with sanctions, and workfare. Our reading of the theoretical literature is …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010321601
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Optimal unemployment insurance design: Time limits, monitoring, or workfare
Fredriksson, Peter; Holmlund, Bertil - 2005
workfare. To that end we develop a quantitative model of equilibrium unemployment. The model features worker heterogeneity in …. Workfare appears to be inferior to the other two systems. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010317971
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Improving incentives in unemployment insurance: A review of recent research
Fredriksson, Peter; Holmlund, Bertil - 2003
sequencing of benefits), monitoring in conjunction with sanctions, and workfare. Our reading of the theoretical literature is …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010321098
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Improving incentives in unemployment insurance : a review of recent research
Fredriksson, Peter; Holmlund, Bertil - 2003
sequencing of benefits), monitoring in conjunction with sanctions, and workfare. Our reading of the theoretical literature is …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011507749
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Optimal Umemployment Insurance Design : Time Limits, Monitoring, or Workfare?
Fredriksson, Peter; Holmlund, Bertil - 2021
workfare. To that end we develop a quantitative model of equilibrium unemployment. The model features worker heterogeneity … monitoring and sanctions than in the other two systems. Workfare appears to be inferior to the other two systems …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013319793
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Improving incentives in unemployment insurance : a review of recent research
Fredriksson, Peter; Holmlund, Bertil - 2003
sequencing of benefits), monitoring in conjunction with sanctions, and workfare. Our reading of the theoretical literature is …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011575185
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Improving incentives in unemployment insurance: A review of recent research
Fredriksson, Peter; Holmlund, Bertil - Institutet för Arbetsmarknads- och Utbildningspolitisk … - 2003
sequencing of benefits), monitoring in conjunction with sanctions, and workfare. Our reading of the theoretical literature is …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005651906
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Optimal Unemployment Insurance with Monitoring and Sanctions
Boone, Jan; Fredriksson, Peter; Holmlund, Bertil; van … - 2001
This paper analyzes the design of optimal unemployment insurance in a search equilibrium framework where search effort among the unemployed is not perfectly observable. We examine to what extent the optimal policy involves monitoring of search effort and benefit sanctions if observed search is...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010321736