In this paper we analyze how a firm might protect quasi-rents in an environmentof imperfect capital markets, where switching lenders is costly to the borrower, andcontracts are incomplete. As switching costs make the firm vulnerable to ex-postexploitation, it may want to diversify lending in...

This paper develops a principal-agent model of financial contracting in which optimal contracts resemble a combination of debt and equity. When defaulting on debt, the firm is punished by disruption of external funding. Such contracts however, invite rivals to compete more aggressively to...

This paper deals with optimal financial contracts which simultaneously provide payincentives and impose constraints on managerial control.

Russian natural gas is delivered to Western Europe by pipelines, running throughUkraine, Poland and other transit countries. We derive the bargaining power of thedifferent players along this supply chain endogenously from the architecture of thetransmission system and its possible extensions by...