The paper explains why some firms transfer their technology to competitors without direct compensation. We consider a Hotelling market where duopolists sell products with different qualities. This market consists of heterogeneous consumers, comprising two groups in terms of their valuations of...

The paper explains why some firms transfer their technology to competitors without direct compensation. We consider a Hotelling market where duopolists sell products with different qualities. This market consists of heterogeneous consumers, comprising two groups in terms of their valuations of...

The paper explains why some firms unilaterally share their technology with competitors. We consider a Hotelling market where duopolists sell products with different qualities. This market consists of heterogeneous consumers, comprising three groups in terms of their valuations of product...

In practice, we often observe that as part of their dual-channel distribution structure, foreign manufacturers carry out foreign direct investment and sell products through domestic retailers, and export products directly through their own EC sites, thereby incurring an export tariff. We revisit...

We study competition between an original equipment manufacturer (OEM) and its contract manufacturer (CM). The CM manufactures a product for the OEM and sells it to the OEM. Contract terms are determined through Nash bargaining. The CM also manufactures its own product and both products are sold...

We investigate a multi-market Cournot model with strategic process R&D investments wherein a multi-market monopolist meets entrants that enter one of the markets. We find that entry can enhance the total R&D expenditure of the incumbent firm. That is, entry can stimulate R&D effort. Moreover,...

We consider a downstream oligopoly model with one dominant and several fringe retailers, who purchase a manufacturing product from a monopoly supplier. We then examine how the supplier's outside option influences the relation between the dominant retailer's bargaining power and the equilibrium...

We consider a downstream oligopoly model with one dominant and several fringe retailers who purchase a manufacturing product from a monopoly supplier. We examine how contract type influences the relationship between the dominant retailer's bargaining power and the equilibrium retail price. If...