We explore the pricing of variance risk by decomposing stocks' total variance into systematicand idiosyncratic return variances. While systematic variance risk exhibits a negative priceof risk, common shocks to the variances of idiosyncratic returns carry a large positive riskpremium. This...

This paper examines the role of bond ratings and the effects of rating-based regulations in thecorporate bond market. Exploiting an unanticipated mechanical change in how the benchmarkLehman bond indices are constructed in 2005, we show that rating-induced market segmentationof the bond market...

We explore the pricing of variance risk by decomposing stocks' total variance into systematicand idiosyncratic return variances. While systematic variance risk exhibits a negative priceof risk, common shocks to the variances of idiosyncratic returns carry a large positive riskpremium. This...

This paper documents a new channel for rating-based bond market segmentation which, in contrast to prior research, is based on non-regulatory asset management practices. A 2005 Lehman Brothers index redefinition provides a quasi-natural experiment in which a number of previously high-yield...

How much of a loan should a lender dynamically retain and how does retention affect loan performance? We address these questions in a dynamic agency model in which a lender originates loans that it can sell to investors. The lender reduces default risk through screening at origination and...

We build a dynamic agency model in which the agent controls both current earnings via short-term investment and firm growth via long-term investment. Under the optimal contract, agency conflicts can induce short- and long-term investment levels beyond first best, leading to short- or...