We argue that the prospect of an imperfect enforcement of debt contracts in default reduces shareholder-debtholder conflicts and induces leveraged firms to invest more and take on less risk as they approach financial distress. To test these predictions, we use a large panel of firms in 41...

We build a model of investment and financing decisions to study the choice between bonds and bank loans in a firm's marginal financing decision and its effects on corporate investment. We show that firms with more growth options, higher bargaining power in default, operating in more competitive...

How much of a loan should a lender dynamically retain and how does retention affect loan performance? We address these questions in a dynamic agency model in which a lender originates loans that it can sell to investors. The lender reduces default risk through screening at origination and...

We build a dynamic agency model in which the agent controls both current earnings via short-term investment and firm growth via long-term investment. Under the optimal contract, agency conflicts can induce short- and long-term investment levels beyond first best, leading to short- or...

Theory has recently shown that corporate policies should depend on firms' exposure to short- and long-lived cash flow shocks and the correlation between these shocks. We provide granular estimates of these parameters for Compustat firms using a new filter that uses only cash flow data and the...