This paper analyzes optimal prevention in a situation of multiple, possibly correlated risks. We focus on probability reduction (self-protection) so that correlation becomes endogenous. If prevention concerns only one risk, introducing a second exogenous risk increases the level of prevention...

This paper studies the effect of increased risk aversion on self-insurance and self-protection in a two-period expected utility framework in which the risk-reducing investment precedes its effect. In contrast to monoperiodic models, self-insurance and self-protection react very similarly to an...

This paper studies the effect of increased risk aversion on self-insurance and self-protection in a two-period expected utility framework in which the risk-reducing investment precedes its effect. In contrast to monoperiodic models, self-insurance and self-protection react very similarly to an...

We develop a model of political cycles driven by time-varying risk aversion. Agents choose to work in the public or private sector and to vote Democrat or Republican. In equilibrium, when risk aversion is high, agents elect Democrats—the party promising more redistribution. The model predicts...

We develop a model of political cycles driven by time-varying risk aversion. Agents choose to work in the public or private sector and to vote Democrat or Republican. In equilibrium, when risk aversion is high, agents elect Democrats---the party promising more redistribution. The model predicts...

We analyze the effect of ambiguous loss probabilities on competitive insurance markets with asymmetric information. We characterize equilibria under actuarially fair pricing with preferences that are second-order ambiguity averse (have smooth indifference curves). We also show existence of...