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Shleifer, Andrei; Glaeser, Edward L. - In: The failure of judges and the rise of regulators, (pp. 209-240). 2012

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009767631

Shleifer, Andrei; Glaeser, Edward L.; Johnson, Simon - In: The failure of judges and the rise of regulators, (pp. 177-208). 2012

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009767636

Salience theory of judicial decisions

Bordalo, Pedro; Gennaioli, Nicola; Shleifer, Andrei - 2013

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010225021

An activity-generating theory of regulation

Schwartzstein, Joshua; Shleifer, Andrei - In: The journal of law & economics 56 (2013) 1, pp. 1-38

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Legal origins

Glaeser, Edward L.; Shleifer, Andrei - 2001

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001594673

Coase versus the Coasians

Glaeser, Edward L.; Johnson, Simon; Shleifer, Andrei - In: The quarterly journal of economics 116 (2001) 3, pp. 853-899

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Toward a theory of legal reform

Hay, Jonathan R. - In: European economic review : EER 40 (1996) 3, pp. 559-567

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Legal Origins

Glaeser, Edward L.; Shleifer, Andrei - In: The quarterly journal of economics 117 (2002) 4, pp. 1193-1229

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Legal origins

Glaeser, Edward L.; Shleifer, Andrei - 2001

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001579607

Legal Origins

Glaeser, Edward L.; Shleifer, Andrei - 2021

A central requirement in the design of a legal system is the protection of law enforcers from coercion by litigants through either violence or bribes. The higher the risk of coercion, the greater the need for protection and control of law enforcers by the state. This perspective explains why, in...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013216846