In Lazear's (1979) model of efficient long-term incentive contracts, employers impose involuntary retirement based on age. This model implies that age discrimination laws, which bar involuntary terminations based on age, discourage the use of such contracts and reduce efficiency. Alternatively,...

We study the effects of state sex and race discrimination laws that were passed prior to federal antidiscrimination legislation. State sex discrimination laws targeted discrimination in pay only. Because an equal pay constraint raises the relative price of female labor, we would expect the...

The question of the effects of race and sex discrimination laws on relative economic outcomes for blacks and women has been of interest at least since the Civil Rights and Equal Pay Acts passed in the 1960s. We present new evidence on the effects of these laws based on variation induced first by...

In Lazear's (1979) model of efficient long-term incentive contracts, employers impose involuntary retirement based on age. This model implies that age discrimination laws, which bar involuntary terminations based on age, discourage the use of such contracts and reduce efficiency. Alternatively,...

In Lazear's model of long-term incentive contracts, age discrimination laws barring age-based involuntary terminations preclude such contracts, reducing efficiency. Alternatively, such laws may serve as precommitment devices for these contracts, without preventing firms from offering strong...

U.S. laws prohibiting race discrimination in labor markets began with state statutes passed in the 1940s and culminated in the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The effects of these laws on relative outcomes for blacks have been hotly debated. We present new evidence based on two sorts of variation:...