This paper considers platform competition in a two-sided market that includes buyers and sellers. One of the platforms … benefits from a favorable coordination bias in the market, in that for this platform it is less costly than for the other … platform to convince customers that the two sides will coordinate on joining it. We find that the degree of the coordination …

We consider dynamic competition among platforms in a market with network externalities. A platform that dominated the … the focal platform whenever such equilibrium exists. Yet when faced with higher-quality competition, can a low …-quality platform remain focal? In the finite-horizon case, the unique equilibrium is efficient for "patient" platforms; with an …

We consider dynamic competition among platforms in a market with network externalities. A platform that dominated the … the focal platform whenever such equilibrium exists. Yet when faced with higher-quality competition, can a low …-quality platform remain focal? In the finite-horizon case, the unique equilibrium is efficient for “patient” platforms; with an …

We consider platform competition in the presence of small users and a user-group. One platform enjoys a quality … -- i.e., joining a low-quality platform because they believe that other users would do the same. We Find that when the … group is sufficiently large to facilitate coordination on the high-quality platform, the group may choose to join the low …

We consider a methodology for studying how beliefs shape platform competition, based on the notion of a partial … focality. The concept of focality is useful for modeling platform competition when the presence of network effects results in …-quality platform to win the market. Yet, dynamic considerations may have positive or negative effect on this ability …

We consider platform competition in the presence of small users and a usergroup. One platform enjoys a quality ….e., joining a low-quality platform because they believe that other users would do the same. We find that when the group is … sufficiently large to facilitate coordination on the high-quality platform, the group may choose to join the low-quality one. When …

We consider dynamic competition among platforms in a market with network externalities. A platform that dominated the … the focal platform whenever such equilibrium exists. Yet when faced with higher-quality competition, can a low …-quality platform remain focal? In the finite-horizon case, the unique equilibrium is efficient for “patient” platforms; with an …

We consider a dynamic platform competition in a market with network externalities. The incumbent platform enjoys a … focal position such that consumers expect other consumers to join it, while the entrant platform may enjoy a quality …