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The impact of inequity aversion on relational incentive contracts
Kragl, Jenny - 2009
Trittbrettfahrerproblems und die Anreizwirkung von Neid. Im dritten Aufsatz wird relationalen Individualbonusverträgen ein relatives … wird für ein Beispiel gezeigt, dass die Zinsspanne, für die der Bonusvertrag das Turnier dominiert, im Neid der Agenten … to the literature, we find that inequity aversion may be beneficial: In the presence of envy, for a certain range of …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009467139
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On the initial allocation of tradeable pollution permits.
MacKenzie, Ian A. - 2007
The objective of this thesis is to investigate the initial allocation of pollution permits in a dynamic tradeable market. Tradeable pollution permit markets are an increasingly common method of environmental regulation and it is apparent that future schemes may have a number of repeated...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009465999
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Essays on incentive contracts under moral hazard and non-verifiable performance
Schoettner, Anja - 2005
measurement on wage costs in U- and J-type tournaments. In U-type tournaments prizes are fixed. In J-type tournaments only an …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009467167
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Contracting with Agents Seeking Status
Bontems, Philippe - 2009
principal in the context of production. We examine in particular the case of envy and we show that in general envy entails … costly observation of private decisions so that we investigate whether envy encourages non compliance or not. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009444735
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Envy and habits : panel data estimates of interdependent preferences
Alvarez-Cuadrado, Francisco; Sutthiphisal, Dhanoos; … - 2012
habits and envy places additional restrictions on the evolution of the optimal consumption path. We use a unique data set …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012530376
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Determinants of Moral hazard in Microfinance: Empirical Evidence from Joint Liability Lending Schemes in Malawi
Simtowe, Franklin; Zeller, Manfred; Phiri, Alexander - 2006
Moral hazard is widely reported as a problem in credit and insurance markets, mainly arising from information asymmetry. Although theorists have attempted to explain the success of Joint Liability Lending (JLL) schemes in mitigating moral hazard, empirical studies are rare. This paper...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009442550
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The Demand for Specialty-Crop Insurance: Adverse Selection and Inefficiency
Richards, Timothy J.; Mischen, Pamela - 1998
The twin problems of moral hazard and adverse selection are often blamed for the lack of insurance for many fruits and vegetables. This paper develops an alternative method of testing for adverse selection that uses a two-stage approach to determine the effects of technical inefficiency on the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009442641
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COOPERATIVE FORMATION AND FINANCIAL CONTRACTING IN AGRICULTURAL MARKETS
Hueth, Brent; Marcoul, Philippe; Ginder, Roger G. - 2003
Cooperative formation in agriculture sometimes occurs in response to the exit of a private firm and typically requires substantial equity investment by participating farmers. What economic rationale can explain why farmers are willing to contribute capital to an activity that (apparently) fails...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009443081
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Use of Penalties and Rewards in Agri-Environmental Policy
Yano, Yuki; Blandford, David - 2008
Achieving high compliance rates in incentive-based agri-environmental schemes is animportant issue. This paper explores the use of a mixed penalty-reward approach underheterogeneous compliance costs. Specifically, we examine the use of a “compliancereward” under asymmetric information and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009443319
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A model-based approach to moral hazard in food chains - What contribution do principal-agent-models make to the understanding of food risks induced by opportunistic behaviour?
Hirschauer, Norbert - 2004
Food risks may be caused by moral hazard, i.e. by opportunisticbehaviour of upstream sellers who exploit the fact that many foodproduct qualities remain uncertain to downstream buyers in thecourse of conventional market transactions (credence qualities).Due to this lack of market transparency...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009443685