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false advertising by a firm in duopolistic competition where consumers can be distinguished according to whether or not they … form rational beliefs about the trustworthiness of advertising claims. We compare private and public law enforcement in the … form of the demand for injunctions against false advertising. From a welfare perspective, we show that it can be optimal …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012012317
Comparative advertising content differs from generic. We discover that dissipative advertising has consequences … depending upon content and cost. Comparison advertising may trigger legal action by rival firms that are named. In the model an … comparison can enhance the signaling potential of dissipative advertising. From the viewpoint of the entrant, the choice of …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014033624
We analyse optimal environmental policies in a market that is vertically differentiated in terms of the energy efficiency of products. Considering energy taxes, subsidies to firms for investment in more eco-friendly products, and product standards, we are particularly interested in how...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003944707
Firms signal high quality through high prices even if the market structure is highly competitive and price competition is severe. In a symmetric Bertrand oligopoly where products may differ only in their quality, production cost is increasing in quality and the quality of each firm’s product...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011372971
We consider an oligopolistic market where firms compete in price and quality and where consumers are heterogeneous in knowledge: some consumers know both the prices and quality of the products offered, some know only the prices and some know neither. We show that two types of signalling...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011376636
We investigate how firms' incentives to acquire customer data for targeted offers depend on its quality. A two-dimensional Hotelling model is proposed where consumers are heterogeneous both with respect to their locations and transportation cost parameters (flexibility). Firms have perfect data...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010204781
This paper studies the effect of a minimum quality standard, a compulsory labeling scheme, and the combination of both instruments in a vertical differentiation model when not all quality dimensions of products can be observed byconsumers. Both a minimum quality standard on the non-observable...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010459945
Two firms produce different qualities at possibly different, constant marginal costs. They compete in quantities on a market where buyers only observe the average quality supplied. The model is a generalization of the standard Cournot duopoly, which corresponds to the special case where the two...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003254850
We study an asymmetric information model in which two firms are active on a market where buyers only observe the average quality supplied. Quantities and cost structures are exogenously given and firms compete in quality. Before choosing their qualities, they bargain over a perfectly enforcable...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003254854
In this note we analyze the sustainability of collusion in a game of repeated interaction where firms can price discriminate among consumers based on two types of customer data. This work is related to Liu and Serfes (2007) and Sapi and Suleymanova (2013). Following Sapi and Suleymanova we...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010343547