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satisfies collusion neutrality, while the Myerson value satisfies component efficiency. Requiring both efficiency and collusion …. Since these solutions also satisfy the superfluous player property, this also `solves' an impossibility for TU-games since … there is no solution for these games that satisfies efficiency, collusion neutrality and the null player property. We give …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011379462
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009720511
One of the main issues in economics is the trade-off between marginalism and egalitarianism. In the context of cooperative games this trade-off can be framed as one of choosing to allocate according to the Shapley value or the equal division solution. In this paper we provide tools that make it...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011372987
player property for delta = 0. We show that efficiency, symmetry, linearity and this delta-reducing player property …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011380928
Recently, cooperative game theory has been applied to various economic allocation problems in which players are not fully anonymous but belong to some relational structure. One of the most developed models in this respect are communications situations or (symmetric) network situations in which...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011334335
Cooperative games on antimatroids are cooperative games restricted by a combinatorial structure which generalize the permission structure. So, cooperative games on antimatroids group several well-known families of games which have important applications in economics and politics. Therefore, the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011327837
We introduce the prediction value (PV) as a measure of players' informational importance in probabilistic TU games. The latter combine a standard TU game and a probability distribution over the set of coalitions. Player i's prediction value equals the difference between the conditional...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010225788
Aguiar et al. (2018) propose the Shapley distance as a measure of the extent to which output sharing among the stakeholders of an organization can be considered unfair. It measures the distance between an arbitrary pay profile and the Shapley pay profile under a given technology, the latter...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011880413
We provide a new characterization of the Shapley value neither using the efficiency axiom nor the additivity axiom. In … this characterization, efficiency is replaced by the gain-loss axiom (Einy and Haimanko, 2011, Game Econ Behav 73: 615 … player axiom. -- Shapley value ; gain-loss axiom ; differential marginality ; efficiency ; additivity …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009680709
We study the impact of the liberalization of EU natural gas markets on the balance of power between `local champions', customers, and outside producers. We distinguish between two steps of the reform: 1. opening access to transit pipes and 2. opening access to distribution systems, hence...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010486635