each district. We analyze the Markov perfect equilibrium under different voting q-rules where q is the number of yes votes … experiment with fiveperson committees that compares three alternative voting rules: unanimity (q=5); majority (q=3); and …

each district. We analyze the Markov perfect equilibrium under different voting q-rules where q is the number of yes votes … experiment with fiveperson committees that compares three alternative voting rules: unanimity (q=5); majority (q=3); and …

-riding. However, people also obey law backed by mild sanctions if it is accepted in a referendum. We show that voting for mild law …

in prisoners' dilemmas, public goods games, and common pool resource games. Participants in these experiments have the …

in prisoners' dilemmas, public goods games, and common pool resource games. Participants in these experiments have the …

in prisoners' dilemmas, public goods games, and common pool resource games. Participants in these experiments have the …

in prisoners' dilemmas, public goods games, and common pool resource games. Participants in these experiments have the …

experiments with group sizes of 3 and 30 again find similar distributions of conditional preferences. The ABC approach predicts …

by not surpassing the point. Our data reveal that contributions are higher if the cost of not reaching the threshold is …