In reviewing the theoretical and empirical literature on collusion, this paper distills methods for detecting cartels and distinguishing collusion from competition.

Under ex ante access regulation entrants often claim that access fees are excessive. I show that this is only the case if further entry is admitted. If the entrant is protected from further entry it would agree with the incumbent upon a strictly positive access fee which may exceed the efficient...

The paper develops a four-step framework to detect anticompetitive horizontal mergers. In the first step, an estimate of the impact of the merger on the market price needs to be derived. Subsequent, the second step of the framework has to assess whether such a predicted price increase would be...

This paper studies ATM coalitions in retail banking. We ask when it is profitable for banks to make agreements which ban direct ATM transaction fees. In the case of a coalition banks loose income from ATM transactions but relax competition in the banking market. We find that such agreements are...

Mis-match of trade statistics between developed and developing countries indicate a substantial mis-invoicing of trade figures, primarily by developing country traders. This is due to the inflexible exchange rate regimes, severe import restrictions and export subsidies prevailing in LDCs. In...

This paper explores the effects that collusion can have in newspaper markets where firms compete for advertising as well as for readership. We compare three modes of competition: i) competition in the advertising and the reader market, ii) semi-collusion over advertising (with competition in the...

This paper analyzes the effect of cooperation in manufacturing on firms' inclination to collude in the market. Compared to non-cooperation in manufacturing, coordination of the investments in production yields a higher competitive profit. If firms intensify cooperation and produce in a joint...

This paper shows that obligations from debt hinder tacit collusion if equity owners are protected by limited liability. In contrast to its advantageous commitment value in short-run competition, leverage reduces profits from infinite interaction. Contrasting uncorrelated shocks with a cyclical...

An antitrust authority deters collusion using fines and a leniency program. Unlike in most of the earlier literature, our firms have imperfect cumulative evidence of the collusion. That is, cartel conviction is not automatic if one firm reports: reporting makes conviction only more likely, the...