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Non-exclusive group contests : an experimental analysis
Song, Jian; Houser, Daniel - In: Journal of economic psychology : research in economic … 87 (2021), pp. 1-17
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013256728
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The strategic formation of social networks : experimental evidence
Pantz, Katinka - 2006
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003306070
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Team competition and the public goods game
Tan, Jonathan H. W.; Bolle, Friedel - In: Economics letters 96 (2007) 1, pp. 133-139
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003485861
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Competition and cooperation in markets : the experimental case of a winner-take-all setting
Ottone, Stefania; Ponzano, Ferruccio - In: The journal of socio-economics 39 (2010) 2, pp. 163-170
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009296006
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A theory of reciprocity
Falk, Armin; Fischbacher, Urs - In: Games and economic behavior 54 (2006) 2, pp. 293-315
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003291183
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Team competition and the public goods game
Tan, Jonathan H. W.; Bolle, Friedel - 2004
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003081208
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A theory of reciprocity
Falk, Armin; Fischbacher, Urs - 2001
This paper presents a formal theory of reciprocity. Reciprocity means that people reward kind actions and punish unkind … ones. The theory takes into account that people evaluate the kindness of an action not only by its consequences but also … the intention underlying this action. The theory explains the relevant stylized facts of a wide range of experimental …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001590591
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A theory of reciprocity
Falk, Armin - 2001
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013423616
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Separation of powers, political competition and efficient provision of public goods
Boukouras, Aristotelis; Koufopoulos, Kostas - 2011 - This Version: 03 September 2010, First Version: 28 September 2007
In this paper we provide a political game where agents decide whether to become legislators or politicians. Legislators determine the political institutions constraining politicians' behavior and politicians compete for gaining the power to make decisions about the level of the public good. We...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010343846
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Yardstick competition, corruption, and electoral incentives
Long, Ngo Van (contributor);  … - 2008
This paper investigates the relationship between electoral incentives, institutions and corruption. We assume that voters use a yardstick criterion. The incumbent provides a public good and extracts rent, which are financed by imposing a distortionary tax. We demonstrate the possibility that...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003730296