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Using accounting data in cartel damage calculations : blessing or menace?

Paha, Johannes - 2009

Standard methods for calculating cartel-damages rely on data of prices charged and quantity sold. Such data may not … easily be available. In this paper, it is shown that a lower bound for cartel-damages can also be computed from accounting … is shown under which econometrically testable assumptions on accounting costs a meaningful lower bound for cartel damages …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003852266

Tacit collusion over foreign direct investment under oligopoly

Collie, David R. - 2009

A two-country model of the FDI versus export decisions of firms is analysed. The analysis considers both the Cournot duopoly and the Bertrand duopoly models with differentiated products. It is shown that the static game is often a prisoners' dilemma where both firms are worse off when they both...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003854272

Simulation and prosecution of a cartel with endogenous cartel formation

Paha, Johannes - 2010

cartelized industry. This paper endogenizes the process of cartel formation in a numeric simulation model where firms differ in … empirical methods used in the detection of cartels. -- Collusion ; Cartel Detection ; Cartel Formation ; Differential Evolution …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003950512

Global cartels, leniency programs and international antitrust cooperation

Choi, Jay Pil; Gerlach, Heiko A. - 2010

In this paper we analyze cartel formation and self-reporting incentives when firms operate in several geographical …-reporting by cartel members. -- cartel formation ; multi-market contact ; leniency programs ; international antitrust cooperation …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003955227

Oligopoly as a socially embedded dilemma : an experiment

Engel, Christoph; Zhurakhovska, Lilia - 2011

cooperation, undercutting is defection. Jointly, competitors are better off if both are faithful to a cartel. Individually, profit … is highest if only the competitor(s) is (are) loyal to the cartel. Yet collusion inflicts harm on the opposite market …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008822475

Fines, leniency, rewards and organized crime : evidence from antitrust experiments

Bigoni, Maria; Fridolfsson, Sven-Olof; Le Coq, Chloé; … - 2008

fines, leniency programs, and reward schemes for whistleblowers on firms' decision to form cartels (cartel deterrence) and …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003666289

Collusion and research joint ventures

Miyagiwa, Kazuyuki (contributor) - 2007

We examine whether cooperation in R&D leads to product market collusion. Suppose that firms engage in a stochastic R&D race while maintaining the collusive equilibrium in a repeated-game framework. Innovation under competitive R&D creates inter-firm asymmetries, which destabilizes the collusive...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003597038

Competition as a socially desirable dilemma theory vs. experimental evidence

Engel, Christoph - 2009

Cartels are inherently instable. Each cartelist is best off if it breaks the cartel, while the remaining firms remain … oligopoly as a linear public good. -- Cartel ; Oligopoly ; Bertrand ; Cournot ; Public Good ; Externality ; Experiment …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003877116

Cartel duration and endogenous private monitoring and communication : an instrumental variables approach

Zhou, Jun - 2012

. Estimating the impact of such collusive practices" - known as the 'lysine strategy profile (LSP)" - on cartel duration is … related to cartel duration. After correction for selectivity in the decision to use the LSP, statistical tests are consistent … with a theoretic prediction that the LSP increases cartel duration. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009571067

Cartel overcharges and the deterrent effect of EU competition law

Smuda, Florian - 2012

This paper examines cartel overcharges for the European market. Using a sample of 191 overcharge estimates and several … parametric and semi-parametric estimation procedures, the impact of different cartel characteristics and the market environment ….37 percent of the selling price and the average cartel duration is 8.35 years. Certain cartel characteristics and the geographic …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009572459