The topological approach to social choice was developed by Graciela Chichilnisky in the beginning of the eighties. The main result in this area (known as the resolution of the topological social choice paradox) shows that a space of preferences admits of a continuous, anonymous, and unanimous...

The existence of a Paretian and finitely anonymous ordering in the set of infinite utility streams implies the existence of a non-Ramsey set (a nonconstructive object whose existence requires the axiom of choice). Therefore, each Paretian and finitely anonymous quasi-ordering either is...

A set of outcomes for a TU-game in characteristic function form is dominant if it is, with respect to an outsider-independent dominance relation, accessible (or admissible) and closed. This outsider-independent dominance relation is restrictive in the sense that a deviating coalition cannot...

A set of outcomes for a transferable utility game in characteristic function form is dominant if it is, with respect to an outsider-independent dominance relation, accessible (or admissible) and closed. This outsider-independent dominance relation is restrictive in the sense that a deviating...

For each outcome (i.e. a payoff vector augmented with a coalition structure) of a TU-game with a non-empty coalition structure core there exists a finite sequence of successively dominating outcomes that terminates in the coalition structure core. In order to obtain this result a restrictive...

A set of outcomes for a TU-game in characteristic function form is dominant if it is, with respect to an outsider-independent dominance relation, accessible (or admissible)and closed. This outsider-independent dominance relation is restrictive in the sense that a deviating coalition cannot...

We investigate the mechanism that provides the optimal decision rule for two agents making joint decisions. It is shown that, a special rectangular mechanism with two sided screening, elicit correct information when agents?preferences are private information. Such mechanism is presented as a...

The existence of a purely finitely additive measure cannot be proved in Zermelo-Frankel set theory if the use of the Axiom of Choice is disallowed.

A set of outcomes for a transferable utility game in characteristic function form is dominant if it is, with respect to an outsider-independent dominance relation, accessible (or admissible) and closed. This outsider-independent dominance relation is restrictive in the sense that a deviating...

We study divisor methods, the primary class to solve apportionment problems, based upon Stolarsky means Saß. These encompass the five traditional methods. We disclose a one-to-one relation between methods of the form Sa1 and aggregate measures of seat/vote disproportionality of the generalized...