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Extortion
Konrad, Kai A.; Skaperdas, Stergios - 1997
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10000167851
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Stigma and social control
Blume, Lawrence E. - 2002
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001690048
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Stigma and social control
Blume, Lawrence E. - 2002
duration will lead to increased crime rates. -- crime ; stigma ; social norms …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009725488
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Organized crime or individual crime? : Endogenous size of a criminal organization and the optimal law enforcement
Chang, Juin-jen; Lu, Huei-chung; Chen, Mingshen - In: Economic inquiry : journal of the Western Economic … 43 (2005) 3, pp. 661-675
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10002985011
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The deterrence effects of gun laws in games with asymmetric skills and information
Oliveira, Cristiano; Balbinotto Neto, Giácomo - In: Review of law and economics : publ. in cooperation with … 11 (2015) 3, pp. 435-452
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011381813
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Gang rivalry and crime : a differential game approach
Faria, João Ricardo; Mixon, Franklin G.; Upadhyaya, Ashish - In: Review of law and economics : publ. in cooperation with … 15 (2019) 2, pp. 1-30
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012197396
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Focusing law enforcement when offenders can choose location
Friehe, Tim; Miceli, Thomas J. - 2014
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010415541
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Optimal law enforcement when individuals are either moral or norm followers
Fluet, Claude; Friehe, Tim - In: Journal of public economic theory 26 (2024) 1, pp. 1-22
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014440835
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Extortion
Konrad, Kai A.; Skaperdas, Stergios - 1998
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001350568
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Is the severity of the penalty an effective deterrent? : a strategic approach for the crime of tax evasion
Chiarini, Bruno; Marzano, Elisabetta - 2016
can be tricky, this paper uses the crime strategic model (inspection game) proposed by Tsebelis. This model shows that any … frequency of violation at equilibrium. This result is misleading: payoffs are not independent and the crime game can not be … crime of tax evasion, where the dishonest taxpayers are rational agents, motivated by the comparison of payoffs, considering …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011544186