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Integer programming and arrovian social welfare functions
Vohra, Rakesh V.; Sethuraman, Jay; Piaw, Teo Chung - 2001
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001653723
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Anonymous monotonic social welfare functions
Sethuraman, Jay; Teo, Chung-Piaw; Vohra, Rakesh V. - In: Journal of economic theory 128 (2006) 1, pp. 232-254
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003335343
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The replacement principle and tree structured preferences
Vohra, Rakesh V. - In: Economics letters 63 (1999) 2, pp. 175-180
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001398886
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Distance weighted voting and a single facility location problem
Vohra, Rakesh V. - In: European journal of operational research : EJOR 41 (1989) 3, pp. 314-320
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001083047
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Combinatorial auctions
Vohra, Rakesh V. - 2015
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011498306
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Advanced mathematical economics
Vohra, Rakesh V. - 2005
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001988919
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The ubiquitous Farkas lemma
Vohra, Rakesh V. - In: Perspectives in operations research : papers in honor …, (pp. 199-210). 2006
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003674816
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[Rezension von: Chwe, Michael Suk-Young, Jane Austen, game theorist]
Vohra, Rakesh V. - In: Journal of economic literature 51 (2013) 4, pp. 1187-1190
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010477805
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Mechanism design : a linear programming approach
Vohra, Rakesh V. - 2011
"Mechanism design is an analytical framework for thinking clearly and carefully about what exactly a given institution can achieve when the information necessary to make decisions is dispersed and privately held. This analysis provides an account of the underlying mathematics of mechanism design...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012674480
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Mechanism design : a linear programming approach
Vohra, Rakesh V. - 2011
"Mechanism design is an analytical framework for thinking clearly and carefully about what exactly a given institution can achieve when the information necessary to make decisions is dispersed and privately held. This analysis provides an account of the underlying mathematics of mechanism design...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009235307