We document that firms whose compensation peers experience weak say on pay votes reduce CEO compensation following those votes. Reductions reflect proxy adviser concerns about peers' compensation contracts and are stronger when CEOs receive excess compensation, when they compete more closely...

This paper investigates interactions between two central corporate governance mechanisms: shareholder rights and managerial ownership. I find that the effect of managerial ownership on firm value crucially depends on shareholder rights. Managerial ownership enhances firm value when shareholder...

Using hand-collected data on CEO appointments during shareholder activism campaigns, this study examines whether shareholder involvement in CEO recruiting affects frictions in CEO hiring decisions. The results indicate that appointments of CEOs who are recruited with shareholder activist...

Theory posits that managerial holdings of debt (“inside debt”) align managers' incentives with those of outside debtholders. Executive pensions, which consist of ERISA-qualified rank-and-file (RAF) plans and Supplemental Executive Retirement Plans (SERPs), and other deferred compensation...

We examine whether criminal records of CEOs and rank-and-file employees are associated with firms’ likelihood of bankruptcy and whether lenders adjust their required cost of debt accordingly. We use a nationwide sample of private firms and criminal registers covering all firm employees. We...