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Direct elicitation of credit constraints: Conceptual and practical issues with an empirical application

Boucher, Stephen R.; Guirkinger, Catherine; Trivelli, … - 2005

Replaced with revised version of paper 08/03/05.

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009442932

Direct elicitation of credit constraints: conceptual and practical issues with an application to Peruvian agriculture

Boucher, Stephen; Guirkinger, Catherine; Trivelli … - In: Economic development and cultural change 57 (2009) 4, pp. 609-640

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003886142

Risk rationing and wealth effects in credit markets

Boucher, Stephen (contributor); … - 2005

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003730009

Direct elicitation of credit constraints : conceptual and practical issues with an empirical application to Peruvian agriculture

Guirkinger, Catherine (contributor); … - 2006

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003730053

Credit constraints and productivity in Peruvian agriculture

Guirkinger, Catherine; Boucher, Stephen - In: Agricultural economics : the journal of the … 39 (2008) 3, pp. 295-308

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003775325

Risk rationing and wealth effects in credit markets : theory and implications for agricultural developments

Boucher, Stephen; Carter, Michael R.; Guirkinger, Catherine - In: American journal of agricultural economics 90 (2008) 2, pp. 409-423

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003700597

Understanding the Coexistence of formal and informal credit markets in Piura, Peru

Guirkinger, Catherine - In: World development : the multi-disciplinary … 36 (2008) 8, pp. 1436-1452

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003748919

RISK RATIONING AND ACTIVITY CHOICE IN MORAL HAZARD CONSTRAINED CREDIT MARKETS

Boucher, Stephen R.; Carter, Michael R. - 2001

This paper explores the productivity and income distribution effects of asymmetric information and risk preferences on the credit market. A model of contract design in the presence of moral hazard is developed in which competitive, risk neutral lenders offer contracts to risk averse agents who...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009444535

Underwriting area-based yield insurance to crowd-in credit supply and demand

Carter, Michael R. (contributor); … - 2007 - Rev.

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003730051

Underwriting area-based yield insurance to crowd-in credit supply and demand

Carter, Michael R.; Galarza, Francisco; Boucher, Stephen - In: Savings and development : quarterly review 31 (2007) 3, pp. 335-362

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003711922

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