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Tournament fever and the perception of strategic uncertainty in performance contests
Uske, Tobias - 2008
processes and the inherent variability of competitors' effort choices introduce uncertainty to tournament settings with respect … uncertainty leads to more excess of effort if compared to optimality (Avrahami et al., 2007). This paper experimentally … responses, and mainly overestimate their opponents. Leveling uncertainty influences both overshooting and the precision of …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010263891
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Tournament Fever and the Perception of StrategicUncertainty in Performance Contests
Uske, Tobias - Max-Planck-Institut für Ökonomik <Jena> / Abteilung … - 2008
the inherent variability of competitors' effort choices introduce uncertainty to tournament settings with respect to the … outcome.If heterogeneous agents interact in such a setting, experimental results suggest thatincreasing uncertainty leads to … mainly overestimate their opponents. Leveling uncertainty inuencesboth overshooting and the precision of beliefs. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005866448
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On the incentive effects of uncertainty in monitoring agents: a theoretical and experimental analysis
Avrahami, Judith; Güth, Werner; Kareev, Yaakov; Uske, … - 2007
depends stochastically on (constant) effort, the number of times that are checked to assign the bonus affects the level of un-certainty … in the selection process. Uncertainty, in turn, is expected to increase the efforts made by competing agents (Cowen and … of uncertainty (sampling occasions of productions, 1 or 3), cost of production (high or low), cost symmetry (asymmetric …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010263840
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On the Incentive Effects of Uncertainty in Monitoring Agents A Theoretical and Experimental Analysis
Avrahami, Judith; Güth, Werner; Kareev, Yakoov; Uske, … - Max-Planck-Institut für Ökonomik <Jena> / Abteilung … - 2007
depends stochastically on (constant) effort, the number of times that are checked to assign the bonus affects the level of un-certainty … in the selection process. Uncertainty, in turn, is expected to increase the efforts made by competing agents (Cowen and … of uncertainty (sampling occasions of productions, 1 or 3), cost of production (high or low), cost symmetry (asymmetric …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005866529
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Testing Canonical Tournament Theory : On the Impact of Risk, Social Preferences and Utility Structure
Sheremeta, Roman M. - 2012
We use experiments to test comparative statics predictions of canonical tournament theory. Both the roles of principal and agent are populated by human subjects, allowing us to test predictions for both incentive responses and optimal tournament design. Consistent with theory, we observed an...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013112121
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Testing Canonical Tournament Theory : On the Impact of Risk, Social Preferences and Utility Structure
Sheremeta, Roman M. - 2012
We use experiments to test comparative statics predictions of canonical tournament theory. Both the roles of principal and agent are populated by human subjects, allowing us to test predictions for both incentive responses and optimal tournament design. Consistent with theory, we observed an...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013111204
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Social Relations and Relational Incentives
Dur, Robert; Tichem, Jan - 2012
This paper studies how social relationships between managers and employees affect relational incentive contracts. To this end we develop a simple dynamic principal-agent model where both players may have feelings of altruism or spite toward each other. The contract may contain two types of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010326344
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Paid to quit
Dur, Robert; Schmittdiel, Heiner - 2013
Inspired by a recent observation about an online retail company, this paper explains why a firm may find it optimal to offer an exit bonus to recent hires so as to induce self-selection. We study a double adverse selection problem, in which the principal can neither observe agents’ commitment...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010326509
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Leniency Bias in Long-Term Workplace Relationships
Tichem, Jan - 2013
This paper studies how firms can efficiently incentivize supervisors to truthfully report employee performance. To this end, I develop a dynamic principal-supervisor-agent model. The supervisor is either selfish or altruistic towards the agent, which is observable to the agent but not to the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010328332
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Workers' participation in wage setting and opportnistic behaviour: Evidence from a gift-exchange experiment
Franke, Jörg; Gurtoviy, Ruslan; Mertins, Vanessa - 2014
Our study analyzes the consequences of workers' participation in the wage setting process on effort exertion. The experimental design is based on a modified giftexchange game where the degree of workers' involvement in the wage setting process is systematically varied among the workers. The...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010343280