Standard models of moral hazard predict a negative relationship between risk and incentives, but the empirical work has … incentives decreases with risk aversion, more risk-averse agents prefer lower-incentive contracts; thus, in the optimal contract …, incentives are positively correlated with endogenous risk. In contrast, if risk aversion is high enough, the possibility of …

assumption, which we relax. We find that, although monetary incentives are effective also with sociallyattentive agents, the … monetary incentives. We also show that the principal benefits from having a socially-attentive agent and how she optimally …

When designing incentives for a manager, the trade-off between insurance and a "good" allocation of effort across …

assumption, which we relax. We find that, although monetary incentives are effective also with sociallyattentive agents, the … monetary incentives. We also show that the principal benefits from having a socially-attentive agent and how she optimally …

One of the standard predictions of the agency theory is that more incentives can be given to agents with lower risk … obtain that lower agent's risk aversion unambiguously leads to higher incentives when the technology function linking …

leads to weaker incentives for effort, compared with non-integration. Our theory makes minimal assumptions about the … managers. The division managers' job is to create profitable investment projects. Giving the managers incentives to do so …' incentives. The resulting tradeoff between a better use of resources and diminished incentives for effort determines whether …

When designing incentives for a manager, the trade-off between insurance and a good allocation of effort across various …