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Managerial hedging and portfolio monitoring
Bisin, Alberto; Gottardi, Piero; Rampini, Adriano A. - 2004
monitoring is costly governance is imperfect. If managerial hedging is detected, shareholders can seize the payoffs of the … poorly, (ii) the more costly monitoring is, the more sensitive is the manager's compensation to firm performance, and (iii … revealed by monitoring. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010261074
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An activist view of CEO compensation
Baum, Alex; Hale, Robert; Morfit, Mason; Larcker, David F. - 2017
Understanding CEO compensation plans is a continuing challenge for directors and investors. The disclosure of these plans is dictated by SEC rules that rely heavily on the “fair value” of awards at the time they are granted. The problem with these numbers is that they are static and do not...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011870307
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Board Independence and the Design of Executive Compensation
Singh, Ravi - 2007
provide excessive incentives to signal that their firms are well-governed. Moreover, to avoid investor criticism, certain …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012732156
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Governance, Conference Calls and CEO Compensation
Price, S. McKay - 2017
We study the relations between governance mechanisms (internal and external), conference call voluntary disclosures (incidence and length), and CEO compensation using hand-collected data on conference calls, corporate governance, and compensation. We hypothesize and show that institutions push...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012974636
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Right on Schedule : CEO Option Grants and Opportunism
Daines, Robert - 2016
In the wake of the backdating scandal, many firms began awarding options at scheduled times each year. Scheduling option grants eliminates backdating, but creates other agency problems. CEOs that know the dates of upcoming scheduled option grants have an incentive to temporarily depress stock...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013006948
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Governance, Conference Calls and CEO Compensation
Price, S. McKay - 2015
We study the relations between governance mechanisms (internal and external), conference call voluntary disclosures (incidence and length), and CEO compensation using hand-collected data on conference calls, corporate governance, and compensation. We hypothesize and show that institutions push...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013030764
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Incentive Alignment through Performance-Focused Shareholder Proposals on Management Compensation
Fortin, Steve - 2014
We investigate an emerging pay-performance activism under a natural setting of performance-focused shareholder proposals rule (PSPs) (Rule 14a-8) established by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) for top management compensation. We find that: (1) PSP sponsors successfully identify...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013066953
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Earnings Management from the Bottom Up : An Analysis of Managerial Incentives Below the CEO
Oberholzer-Gee, Felix - 2012
. However, recent evidence suggests that high-powered incentives also provide managers with incentives to manipulate the firm … firm hierarchy — division managers and Chief Financial Officers — are likely to have similar incentives, and perhaps even …, previous research focuses on equity incentives and largely ignores other elements of incentive pay. We contribute to this …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013112655
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Mutual guarantee institutions and small business finance
Columba, Francesco; Gambacorta, Leonardo; Mistrulli, … - Bank for International Settlements / Monetary and …
A large body of literature has shown that small firms experience difficulties in accessing the credit market due to informational asymmetries. Banks can overcome these asymmetries through relationship lending, or at least mitigate their effects by asking for collateral. Small firms, especially...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009138470
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Managerial Hedging and Portfolio Monitoring
Bisin, Alberto; Gottardi, Piero; Rampini, Adriano A. - CESifo - 2004
monitoring is costly governance is imperfect. If managerial hedging is detected, shareholders can seize the payoffs of the … poorly, (ii) the more costly monitoring is, the more sensitive is the manager’s compensation to firm performance, and (iii … revealed by monitoring. …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005094243