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We consider in this paper two Markovian processes X and Y, solutions of a stochastic differential equation with jumps, that are comonotonic, i.e., that are such that for all t, almost surely, X_{t} is greater in one state of the world than in another if and only if the same is true for Y_{t}....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008793342
We consider the problem of optimal risk sharing of some given total risk between two economic agents characterized by law-invariant monetary utility functions or equivalently, law-invariant risk measures. We first prove existence of an optimal risk sharing allocation which is in addition...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008793978
We show that a rational expectations equilibrium need not be incentive compatible, need not be implementable as a perfect Bayesian equilibrium and may not be fully Pareto optimal, unless the utility functions are state independent. A comparison of rational expectations equilibria with core...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010293711
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We show that a rational expectations equilibrium need not be incentive compatible, need not be implementable as a perfect Bayesian equilibrium and may not be fully Pareto optimal, unless the utility functions are state independent. A comparison of rational expectations equilibria with core...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005704188
We investigate the continuity of equilibrium in differential information economies with a finite number of agents. In this setting, agents can make contingent contracts based on events that are commonly observed. With private information modelled as finite partitions of a compact and metrizable...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005059459
Considered here are transferable-utility, coalitional production or market games, featuring differently informed players. It is assumed that personalized contracts must comply with idiosyncratic information. The setting may create two sorts of shadow prices: one for material endowments, the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008876392