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We use a two-issue bargaining model with asymmetric information to study agent choice of how to structure bargaining. We uncover the settings in which different agenda structures are chosen in equilibrium, how the order in which issues are bargained over matters, and what impact the rules for...
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We use a two-issue bargaining model with asymmetric information to study agent choice of how to structure bargaining. We uncover the settings in which different agenda structures are chosen in equilibrium, how the order in which issues are bargained over matters, and what impact the rules for...
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