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Aggregating Performance Measures in Multitask Principal-Agent Relationships

Thiele, Veikko - 2010

It has been argued in the multitask agency literature that effort distortion can be mitigated by applying several …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012716711

Performance Measurement in Multi-Task Agencies

Thiele, Veikko - 2010

This paper analyzes a multi-task agency relationship with a risk-neutral and financially constraint agent. The agent's performance evaluation is incongruent, i.e. it does not reflect his contribution to firm value, and thus motivates an inefficient effort allocation across tasks. This paper...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014218745

Performance Measurement in Multi-Task Agencies

Thiele, Veikko - 2010

This paper analyzes a multi-task agency model with a risk-neutral and financially constrained agent. The agent's performance evaluation is thereby incongruent, i.e. it does not perfectly reflect the relative contribution of the agent's multi-dimensional effort to firm's profit. This paper...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014028223

Implicit contracts, incentive compatibility, and involuntary unemployment : thirty years on

MacLeod, William Bentley; Malcomson, James M. - 2023

"Implicit Contracts, incentive compatibility, and involuntary unemployment" (MacLeod and Malcomson, 1989) remains our most highly cited work. We briefly review the development of this paper and of our subsequent related work, and conclude with reflections on the future of relational contract...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013500553

Differences in social preferences : are they profitable for the firm?

Küpper, Hans-Ulrich; Sandner, Kai - 2008

This paper analyzes the impact of heterogeneous (social) preferences on the weighting and combination of performance measures as well as on a firm's profitability. We consider rivalry, egoism and altruism as extreme forms within the continuum of possible preferences and show that the principal...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010442170

Balancing performance measures when agents behave competitively in an environment with technological interdependencies

Sandner, Kai - 2008

This paper addresses the question, what metrics should be used for performance evaluation and in particular how they should be weighted and combined in the presence of technological interdependencies when the agents exhibit variedly strong developed rivalry. We find that the principal reacts to...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010442171

Implicit Contracts, Incentive Compatibility, and Involuntary Unemployment: Thirty Years On

MacLeod, W. Bentley; Malcomson, James - 2023

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014296625

Optimal Incentive Contracts for Experts

Köhler, Wolfgang R. - 2004

problem to design a contract that provides an expert with incentives to acquire and reveal information. We show that it is in … provision of incentives when the realized state is not verifiable …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010263103

Resource allocation and firm scope

Friebel, Guido; Raith, Michael - 2006

leads to weaker incentives for effort, compared with non-integration. Our theory makes minimal assumptions about the … managers. The division managers' job is to create profitable investment projects. Giving the managers incentives to do so …' incentives. The resulting tradeoff between a better use of resources and diminished incentives for effort determines whether …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010268001

Optimal Incentive Contracts for Experts

Köhler, Wolfgang R. - University of Bonn, Germany - 2004

problem to design a contract that provides an expert with incentives to acquire and reveal information. We show that it is in … provision of incentives when the realized state is not verifiable …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005001487