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It has been argued in the multitask agency literature that effort distortion can be mitigated by applying several …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012716711
This paper analyzes a multi-task agency relationship with a risk-neutral and financially constraint agent. The agent's performance evaluation is incongruent, i.e. it does not reflect his contribution to firm value, and thus motivates an inefficient effort allocation across tasks. This paper...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014218745
This paper analyzes a multi-task agency model with a risk-neutral and financially constrained agent. The agent's performance evaluation is thereby incongruent, i.e. it does not perfectly reflect the relative contribution of the agent's multi-dimensional effort to firm's profit. This paper...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014028223
"Implicit Contracts, incentive compatibility, and involuntary unemployment" (MacLeod and Malcomson, 1989) remains our most highly cited work. We briefly review the development of this paper and of our subsequent related work, and conclude with reflections on the future of relational contract...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013500553
This paper analyzes the impact of heterogeneous (social) preferences on the weighting and combination of performance measures as well as on a firm's profitability. We consider rivalry, egoism and altruism as extreme forms within the continuum of possible preferences and show that the principal...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010442170
This paper addresses the question, what metrics should be used for performance evaluation and in particular how they should be weighted and combined in the presence of technological interdependencies when the agents exhibit variedly strong developed rivalry. We find that the principal reacts to...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010442171
"Implicit Contracts, incentive compatibility, and involuntary unemployment" (MacLeod and Malcomson, 1989) remains our most highly cited work. We briefly review the development of this paper and of our subsequent related work, and conclude with reflections on the future of relational contract...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014296625
problem to design a contract that provides an expert with incentives to acquire and reveal information. We show that it is in … provision of incentives when the realized state is not verifiable …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010263103
leads to weaker incentives for effort, compared with non-integration. Our theory makes minimal assumptions about the … managers. The division managers' job is to create profitable investment projects. Giving the managers incentives to do so …' incentives. The resulting tradeoff between a better use of resources and diminished incentives for effort determines whether …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010268001
problem to design a contract that provides an expert with incentives to acquire and reveal information. We show that it is in … provision of incentives when the realized state is not verifiable …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005001487