We survey the main results on strategic information transmission, which is often referred to as ``persuasion" when types are verifiable and as ``cheap talk" when they are not. In the simplest ``cheap talk'' model, an informed player sends a single message to a receiver who makes a decision. The...

This paper examines ¯nite parimutuel betting games with asymmetric information, with par-ticular attention to di®erences between sequential and simultaneous settings, and betweenfully rational and myopic (\price taking") behavior. In the simultaneous parimutuel market,all (symmetric and...

Parikh and Krasucki (1990, JET 52) have suggested in an informal manner that a consensus does not require common knowledge. Weyers (1992, CORE DP 9228) has proved that their model does not permit such a conclusion, and that a more general one has to be constructed. Heifetz (1996, JET 70) has...

This paper surveys the notion of common knowledge taken from game theory and computer science. It studies and illustrates more generally the effects of interactive knowledge in economic and social problems. First of all, common knowledge is shown to be a central concept and often a necessary...

We study sequential parimutuel betting markets with asymmetrically informed bettors, using an experimental approach. In one treatment, groups of eight participants play twenty repetitions of a sequential betting game. The second treatment is identical, except that bettors are observed by other...

This paper examines finite parimutuel betting games with asymmetric information, with particular attention to differences between sequential and simultaneous settings, and betweenfully rational and myopic ("price taking") behavior. In the simultaneous parimutuel market,all (symmetric and...

How should a seller optimally sell his good to a buyer whose willingness to pay depends on his privately-known taste and on product characteristics privately known by the seller? The optimum is characterized by a mediated selling protocol and is sometimes implementable by bilateral face-to-face...

This paper studies experimentally the value of private information in strictly competitive interactions with asymmetric information. We implement in the laboratory three examples from the class of zero-sum repeated games with incomplete information on one side and perfect monitoring. The stage...

Using a collective model of consumption, we characterize optimal commodity taxes aimed at targeting specific individuals within the household. The main message is that distortionary indirect taxation can circumvent the agency problem of the household. Essentially, taxation should discourage less...

We examine the relative merits of targeting children within the household through price subsidies and cash transfers. To do so, we model the behavior of a household composed of one adult and one child. We then show that 'favorable' distortions from price subsidies may allow redistributing toward...