conflict is modeled as a Bayesian game on which each player's valuation is drawn independently from arbitrary distributions. We … predictable movements in the conflict's dissipation. We focus on arbitrary contest success functions and arbitrary independent …

conflict is modeled as a Bayesian game on which each player´s valuation is drawn independently from arbitrary distributions. We … predictable movements in the conflict´s dissipation. We focus on arbitrary contest success functions and arbitrary independent …

Two individuals are involved in a conflict situation in which preferences are ex ante uncertain. While they eventually …

setting in which there is no conflict in material interests: a proposer, holding the role of residual claimant, chooses the … harms the proposer. Notwithstanding, maximal claims by proposers are predominant for all game types. This generates conflict … and results in a considerable loss of efficiency. -- Social Preferences ; Conflict ; Experimental Economics ; Bargaining …

Two individuals are involved in a conflict situation in which preferences are ex ante uncertain. While they eventually …

This paper explores the role of conflict as a bargaining tool. It first presents a simple bargaining model with one …-sided incomplete information. Parties can choose the scope of the confrontation they may want to engage in: A limited conflict that … only introduces delay, or an absolute conflict that terminates the game. The outcomes of both types of confrontation are …

This paper studies bargaining and conflict under incomplete information, provides an overview and a critical account of … sequential bargaining that take confrontation as final. Conflict and inefficiencies are to be expected in these models whenever … parties have optimistic prospects on the outcome of the all-out conflict. After examining the causes and reasons for this …