In Ulph (2002) I analysed how the possibility of future resolution of uncertainty about damage costs affected the incentives and timing for countries to join a self-enforcing international environmental agreement (IEA). I analysed two membership rules – fixed (countries commit whether to...

In this paper, we develop a model of advertising in a differentiated duopoly in which firms first decide how much to invest in cooperative or predatory advertising and then engage in product market competition (Cournot or Bertrand). We then use this model, with endogenously determined type of...

A number of countries have recently introduced legislation which holds polluters liable for the costs of cleaning up environmental damage they have caused. While in principle this gives polluters appropriate incentives to reduce the risk of environmental damage, these incentives are weakened if...

Concerns have been expressed that in a global market place with mobile capital, national governments will have incentives to set weak environmental policies (“environmental dumpingâ€) to protect the international competitiveness of their domestic firms, that these incentives are...

We address two concerns: trade liberalisation may lead to a race-to-the bottom in environmental standards; supra-national agencies, who might overcome this, may be captured by special interest groups. This raises two sets of choices: whether to set environmental policy at the national or...

This paper evaluates the impact of relocations of public employment across cities on private sector activity. To identify the effect of changes in public employment on the private sector, we exploit the relocation of the German Federal Government from Berlin to Bonn in the wake of the Second...