competition. Three models are considered: Taxation and Redistribution, Public Goods, and Fixed Prices. In each case, the value …

redistribution and retraining - that arguably characterize many reform packages. We analyse the interaction of compensatory …. Conversely, it may be possible for an economic reform to win political support in the absence of compensatory redistribution … redistribution and retraining programmes, and demonstrate that the provision of redistributive programmes might distort incentives …

' policy choices by transferring money to them. We observe very high levels of redistribution - even when transfers to …

of the lobbying investment depends on whether or not the candidates are willing to respond and able to collude on lowtax … policies that do not harm their relative chances in the elections. In the experiment, we find that lobbying is never successful … when the lobbyist and candidates interact just once. By contrast, it yields substantially lower redistribution in about 40 …

equilibrium predictions. -- Redistribution ; double auction ; elections ; lobbying …' policy choices by transferring money to them. We observe very high levels of redistribution - even when transfers to …

fund capture. A model is presented where rich voters can block redistribution by buying the votes of some poor voters. In … equilibrium there is only limited redistribution and income tax rates are a negative function of government corruption. When rich …. -- tax rates ; vote-buying ; lobbying ; government corruption …

of the lobbying investment depends on whether or not the candidates are willing to respond and able to collude on low …-tax policies that do not harm their relative chances in the elections. In the experiment, we find that lobbying is never successful … when the lobbyist and candidates interact just once. By contrast, it yields substantially lower redistribution in about 40 …

’ policy choices by transferring money to them. We observe very high levels of redistribution – even when transfers to …