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The economics of permissible WTO retaliation
Bown, Chad P.; Ruta, Michele - 2008
We examine how theoretical and quantitative economic analysis has and can be used in this stage of the DSU process … each of the ten DSU arbitrations that have taken place thus far into one of these categories and compare the arbitrators … likely to take place under the DSU. Finally, in the disputes in which this reciprocity approach has not been used, we …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010326717
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A Survey of the Literature on the WTO Dispute Settlement System
Horn, Henrik; Mavroidis, Petros C. - 2006
This paper surveys the law and economics literature on WTO dispute settlement. As a background, we first briefly lay out main features of the legal framework, and discuss possible roles of a dispute settlement mechanism. We then discuss the two main themes in the empirical literature on dispute...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010320036
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(When) Does Tit-for-Tat Diplomacy in Trade Policy Pay Off?
Dluhosch, Barbara; Horgos, Daniel - 2012
In international relations, short-run incentives for non-cooperation often dominate. Yet, (external) institutions for enforcing cooperation are hampered by national sovereignty, supposedly strengthening the role of selfenforcing mechanisms. This paper examines their scope with a focus on...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011345494
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WTO Dispute Settlement: An Economic Analysis of four EU-US Mini Trade Wars
Breuss, Fritz - 2004
Since its inception in 1995, more than 312 disputes have been raised under the WTO Dispute Settlement System. Despite the obvious success of this system, several shortcomings call for a revision under the auspices of the Doha Development Round. With a computable general equilibrium model we...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011435167
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(When) Does tit-for-tat diplomacy in trade policy pay off?
Dluhosch, Barbara; Horgos, Daniel - 2012
In international relations, short-run incentives for non-cooperation often dominate. Yet, (external) institutions for enforcing cooperation are hampered by national sovereignty, supposedly strengthening the role of selfenforcing mechanisms. This paper examines their scope with a focus on...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010292654
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Mapping of dispute settlement mechanisms in regional trade agreements: Innovative or variations on a theme?
Chase, Claude; Yanovich, Alan; Crawford, Jo-Ann; Ugaz, … - 2013
Regional trade agreements (RTAs) have become an indelible feature of the international trading landscape. Most, if not all, RTAs contain provisions that establish procedures for resolving disputes among their signatory members. Yet, the design and functioning of these dispute settlement...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010326794
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Supporting developing countries in WTO dispute settlement
Johannesson, Louise - 2016
Even though the World Trade Organization (WTO) ensures equal access to the dispute settlement system, the legal process is still highly costly, an aspect that primarily affects poorer developing countries. It is feared that this imbalance discourages developing countries from filing and...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011794586
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The Optimal Design of Trade Policy Flexibility in the WTO
Schropp, Simon; Mahlstein, Kornel - International Economics Section, The Graduate Institute … - 2007
This paper is a contribution to the literature on rational design of trade agreements. The World Trade Organization (WTO) is an incomplete contract among sovereign states. Incomplete contracts contain gaps. Ex post, contractual gaps may leave gains from trade unrealized; they may create...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10004980260
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The time WTO panels require to issue reports
Horn, Henrik - 2013
Almost all WTO dispute panels exceed their statutory time limits. This is often seen to indicate a more general problem for panels to manage their tasks. The time required varies considerably across panels however, suggesting that they do not face the same problems. To shed light on these...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010335632
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(When) does tit-for-tat diplomacy in trade policy pay off?
Dluhosch, Barbara; Horgos, Daniel - 2012
In international relations, short-run incentives for non-cooperation often dominate. Yet, (external) institutions for enforcing cooperation are hampered by national sovereignty, supposedly strengthening the role of selfenforcing mechanisms. This paper examines their scope with a focus on...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011374353