Games with incomplete information or randomness in the moves of others typically have many decision … of randomizations in the type of a player. Solution concepts, assumptions or paradoxes in games should be independent of … the formulation of the game used. I refer to this axiom as TIGER, for "Type Independence among Games which are …

We make three contributions to the theory of contracting under asymmetric information. First, we establish a … competitive revelation principle for contracting games in which several principals compete for one privately informed agent. In …

We introduce the framework of noncooperative pregames and demonstrate that for all games with sufficiently many players … information. …

equilibrium under fictitious play like learning processes. We use two 4 x 4 games each with a unique mixed Nash equilibrium; one … is stable and one is unstable under learning. Both games are versions of Rock-Paper-Scissors with the addition of a …We report experiments designed to test between Nash equilibria that are stable and unstable under learning. The 'TASP …

games learning fails to converge to any equilibrium, either in terms of marginal frequencies or of average play. Subjects … played repeatedly in fixed pairings one of two 3 ´ 3 games, each having a unique Nash equilibrium in mixed strategies. The … equilibrium of one game is predicted to be stable under learning, the other unstable, provided payoffs are sufficiently high. We …

We investigate the stability of mixed strategy equilibria in 2 person (bimatrix) games under perturbed best response … set of perturbed equilibria is shown also for (rescaled) partnership games (also know as games of identical interest …). Some applications of these result to stochastic learning models are given. …

equilibrium under fictitious play like learning processes. We use two 4 x 4 games each with a unique mixed Nash equilibrium; one … is stable and one is unstable under learning. Both games are versions of Rock-Paper-Scissors with the addition of a …We report experiments designed to test between Nash equilibria that are stable and unstable under learning. The “TASP …

conclude that learning effects are more important than selection effects for explaining differences between inexperienced and …

Using coordination games, we study whether social norm perception differs between inexperienced and experienced … the context of daily life does not differ between the two groups. We therefore conclude that learning through experience …