We investigate American options in a multiple prior setting of continuous time and determine optimal exercise strategies form the perspective of an ambiguity averse buyer. The multiple prior setting relaxes the presumption of a known distribution of the stock price process and captures the idea...

This paper studies the costs and benefits of delegating decisions to superiorly informed agents relative to the use of rigid, non discretionary contracts. Delegation grants some flexibility in the choice of the action by the agent, but also requires the use of an appropriate incentive contract...

In this paper, we consider a decision-maker who tries to learn the distribution of outcomes from previously observed cases. For each observed database of cases the decision-maker predicts a set of priors expressing his beliefs about the underlying probability distribution. We impose a version of...

We consider long-run behavior of agents assessing risk in terms of dynamic convex risk measures or, equivalently, utility in terms of dynamic variational preferences in an uncertain setting. By virtue of a robust representation, we show that all uncertainty is revealed in the limit and agents...

The nonexistence of equilibria in models of electoral competition involving multiple issues is one of the more puzzling results in political economics. In this paper, we relax the standard assumption that parties act as expected utility maximizers. We show that equilibria often exist when...

We consider long-run behavior of agents assessing risk in terms of dynamic convex risk measures or, equivalently, utility in terms of dynamic variational preferences in an uncertain setting. By virtue of a robust representation, we show that all uncertainty is revealed in the limit and agents...

In this paper we give an alternative characterization for time-consistent sets of measures in a discrete setting. For each measure P in a time-consistent set Ρ we get a distinct set of predictable processes which in return decribe the P uniquely. This implies we get a one-to-one correspondence...

The problem of how to rationally aggregate probability measures occurs in particular (i) when a group of agents, each holding probabilistic beliefs, needs to rationalise a collective decision on the basis of a single 'aggregate belief system' and (ii) when an individual whose belief system is...

The completeness axiom of choice has been questioned for long, and in response, theoretical models of decision making allowing for incomplete preferences have been developed. So far the theoretical accomplishments have however not been paired with empirical evidence on the actual existence of...

Two of the most well known regularities observed in preferences under risk and uncertainty are ambiguity aversion and the Allais paradox. We study the behavior of an agent who can display both tendencies simultaneously. We introduce a novel notion of preference for hedging that applies to both...