models of communication and hierarchy restrictions in cooperative games, compare different network structures with each other …. Two well-known network structures are hierarchies and communication networks. We give an overview of the most common … and discuss network structures that combine communication as well as hierarchical features. Throughout the survey, we …

models of communication and hierarchy restrictions in cooperative games, compare different network structures with each other …. Two well-known network structures are hierarchies and communication networks. We give an overview of the most common … and discuss network structures that combine communication as well as hierarchical features. Throughout the survey, we …

In this paper we introduce and characterize two new values for transferable utility games with graph restricted … communication and a priori unions. Both values are obtained by applying the Shapley value to an associated TU-game. The graph …

We examine a new class of games, which we call social games, where players not only choose strategies but also choose … players in different roles, among other things. We also examine finite repetitions of games where players may choose to … rematch in any period. Some equilibria of fixed-player repeated games cannot be sustained as equilibria in a repeated social …

This chapter studies the theory of value of games with infinitely many players.Games with infinitely many players are …-handed influence. The interactions are modeled as cooperative games with a continuum of players. In general, the continuum consists of … framework for mathematical analysis, and approximates the results for large finite games well. Also, it enables a unified view …

We examine a new class of games, which we call social games, where players not only choose strategies but also choose … players in different roles, among other things. We also examine finite repetitions of games where players may choose to … rematch in any period. Some equilibria of fixed-player repeated games cannot be sustained as equilibria in a repeated social …