The authors perform an original research on the fundamentals of winning virtuous strategies creation toward the leveraged buyout transactions implementation during the private equity investment in the conditions of the resonant absorption of discrete information in the diffusion-type financial...

Using hand-collected proxy statement data, we examine the distribution of performance metrics used to calculate executive compensation in 86 US oil and gas firms. We find that the distribution of achieved–target differences is significantly discontinuous at zero over the 13-year period...

This paper investigates the impact of the target chief executive officer’s (CEO) postmerger position on the purchase premium and target shareholders’ abnormal returns around the announcement of the deal in a sample of bank mergers during the period 1990–2004. We find evidence that the...

Using a large sample of U.S. acquiring and non-acquiring firms and covering a broad sample of transactions, we examine the effects of mergers and acquisitions (M&A) on CEO compensation during 1993-2006, a period of intense M&A activity. We alleviate endogeneity concerns through dynamic panel...

We examine the impact of acquisitions by UK acquirers on executive pay. The overall sample shows a significant transitory pay increase. Pay changes are not affected by target nationality or organizational form, although initial cross-border acquisitions result in higher pay. Pay increases are...

Unscheduled stock options to target CEOs are a non-trivial phenomenon during private merger negotiations. In 920 acquisition bids during 1999-2007, over 13% of targets grant them. These options substitute for golden parachutes and compensate target CEOs for benefits they forfeit because of the...

This study tests whether bank mergers are associated with valuation gains and examines how equity overvaluation and management compensation incentives influence any valuation effects. Our evidence shows that bidders are overvalued relative to their targets, especially in equity offer deals. We...

Widespread losses during the recent financial crisis have increased concerns that equity-based compensation for bank CEOs causes excessive risk-taking by banks. Debt-based compensation, so-called inside debt, aligns the interests of CEOs with those of external creditors. We examine whether...

This paper examines the mechanisms by which acquirer CEOs are incentivized and their impact on merger decisions. We argue that the pre-merger structure of CEO wealth impacts a CEO's risk tolerance and ultimately her willingness to undertake a merger as well as the framework of the deal. As the...