In this paper we introduce the reactivity in decision-form games. The concept of reactivity allows us to give a natural concept of rationalizable solution for decision-form games: the solubility by elimination of sub- reactive strategies. This concept of solubility is less demanding than the...

In this paper we formalize a new form of two-player game, that we call decision- form. A two-player decision-form game consists in a pair of decision rules, representing the rationality of each player. We develop the basic facts of this type of games, showing that this form of game generalizes...

In this paper we propose a concept of rationalizable solution for two-player decision-form games: the solution by iterated elimination of non-reactive strategies. Several original theorems are proved about this kind of solution. We study the relations between solutions by iterated elimination of...

We introduce here the second volume of the Handbook of Game Theory and Industrial Organization, by L. C. Corchón and M. A. Marini (ed.), Edward Elgar, Cheltenam, UK and Northampton, MA, describing its main aim and its basic structure.

In the present introductory work we propose an original analytical model of coopetitive game. We suggest possible general and feasible solutions; in particular, from a coopetitive perspective, we suggest compromise solutions - for our coopetitive game, by using Kalai-Smorodinsky method.

We introduce the novel concept of a three-dimensional payoff matrix based on a simplified version of a card game. This matrix is necessary to represent the three variables which correspond to the dynamics of the game. We find Sonnaville-Mensink Equilibria (SME) that represent the optimal actions...

We consider a two-stage serial supply chain with capacity limits, where each installation is operated by managers attempting to minimize their own costs. A multiple-period model is necessitated by the multiple stages, capacity limits, stochastic demand, and the explicit consideration of...

This paper creates a game theoretic model to determine how pendulum arbitration or baseball arbitration impacts the incentives of litigants. Pendulum arbitration is when both parties submit competing proposals and the arbitrator chooses only one of the bids, in its entirety, to be binding on...

Does inequality hinder or promote cooperation? To answer this question, we study a Prisoner’s Dilemma with local adaptation, to which we add heterogeneity in payoffs. In our model, agents vary in their wealth, and this inequality affects their potential gains and losses. We find that, in such...

In the Ultimatum Game (UG) one player, named “proposer”, has to decide how to allocate a certain amount of money between herself and a “responder”. If the offer is greater than or equal to the responder’s minimum acceptable offer (MAO), then the money is split as proposed, otherwise,...