In a model inspired by the EU Emissions Trading Scheme, non-cooperative countries allocate their emissions to internationally trading and non-trading sectors. Each country is better off with trading than without, and aggregate welfare is maximized with all sectors in the trading scheme. We...

The EU Emission Trading Scheme (EU ETS) is a key instrument in European climate policy. Evidence from the first trading period (2005-2007) and the first year of the Kyoto period 2008 dampened, however, ex-ante enthusiasm: because of substantial over-allocation of emissions allowances in the...

The EU Emission Trading Scheme (EU ETS) that covers emitters from industry and energy supply representing 40 percent of the EU's greenhouse gas emissions is the biggest implementation of a cap-and-trade scheme worldwide. In this paper, we analyse sectoral allocation caps focusing on three...

Emission trading has been the key instrument in the EU's climate policy since its introduction in 2005. According to economic literature, emissions trading should ensure the achievement of a given reduction target at the lowest possible costs, by equalising marginal abatement costs of the...

Emission trading has been the key instrument in the EU's climate policy since its introduction in 2005. According to economic literature, emissions trading should ensure the achievement of a given reduction target at the lowest possible costs, by equalising marginal abatement costs of the...

Purpose – This paper aims to identify under which circumstances company internal emission trading schemes (IETS) are applied and to examine their actual effects on corporate greenhouse-gas (GHG) emissions. Design/methodology/approach – Using contingency theory, factors are identified that...

In this note we consider the preferences of a profit maximizing firm for international ownership in a world in which firms compete in an international Cournot oligopoly, and in which countries use strategic trade policy. We find that firms prefer national ownership and show that full...

We relax the standard assumption in the strategic trade policy literature that governments possess complete information about the economy. Assuming instead that governments must obtain information from firms, we examine firms' incentive to disclose information to the governments in the...